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Review by Roger Bishop
The 13 days of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962 are generally considered to be the time when the world came closest to a nuclear war. How did President Kennedy reach crucial decisions at each stage of the crisis? Which of his advisers made the most persuasive arguments? What led him to a peaceful diplomatic resolution of the Soviet-U.S. confrontation?
There have been many books written about the crisis, including 35 currently in print. Now, thanks to JFK himself, we are much closer to authoritative answers to the above and other questions. There was a tape recorder, activated by the President, which recorded key policy-making discussions at that time in the Cabinet Room and in the Oval Office. Other than the President, only his secretary, Mrs. Evelyn Lincoln, and two Secret Service agents who were responsible for changing the tapes, and possibly Robert Kennedy, knew of the recorder. We do not know the President's motives, but the system was installed just that summer. With the President's keen interest in history, it may have been for the historical accuracy of his memoirs.
The transcripts of those crucial conversations have just been published as "The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis." After years of painstaking work in identifying the participants (in places, remarks are transcribed but it is noted that it is uncertain who is speaking) and transcription, they are probably the most important primary source for study of the crisis. Beyond that, as the editors, Harvard professors Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, assert, "As records of frantic deliberation in a time of crisis, these tapes have no parallel in any other time or place in history."
There are several overall impressions. One is the sheer complexity of the situation and the constant overlapping of diplomatic and military considerations. By the time that the Secretaries of State and Defense and their deputies and the President's National Security adviser met with the chief executive they had digested a lot of information and analysis.
Secretary of State Dean Rusk and his deputy, George Ball, usually urge caution. General Maxwell Taylor, representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Secretary McNamara stress military preparedness. Robert Kennedy, who did not have foreign policy experience, is a very active participant in the meetings, especially raising pertinent questions.
At the center is the President, asking probing questions and eager to hear what his advisers say. It is fascinating to read how the President is able to absorb great quantities of information and different approaches.
Even if one disagrees with the editors on certain points, their concluding chapter is as stimulating and as sophisticated a discussion of the crisis as one could hope for. Among other things, they explain that Khrushchev's strategy to put missiles in Cuba related to his plans for Berlin, as the President and some of his advisers thought was the case. "The Cuban gamble can thus be seen as a climax in the Cold War . . . Khrushchev failed both in his immediate gamble and in his plans for Berlin. It is not farfetched to characterize the missile crisis as the Pearl Harbor and Midway of the Cold War. Never again . . . would the Soviet challenge or the Western response be so direct and intense."
Roger Bishop is contributing editor to BookPage.
©1997, ProMotion, inc.
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